

CRISIS NOTES

Don't
flaming

6906

6 Aug, 1964

ONE

0930 Bill Hyland (Mike Bridgman)

8-6-64
6 AUG 1964

me at ISA, 2 days
after Tonkin Gulf!

1) Sows not inclined to join NV-Chinese adventures;
will not let hand be forced.

2) Sows prob. won't join actively (except some
material support) ~~with~~ if they see move as limited

3) to Asia

b) not change in policy worldwide, to more aggressive approach.

3) Sows prob. badly informed by NV & Chinese; in
this case, prob. 2) misinformed b) may be given
exaggerated picture. Helpful to inform them directly
of limited nature of move.

[Would we be inhibited from this by fear of
back, or from public message, because of election
issues? See in May 1960.]

4) Talking to the world not have adverse effect (such as
showing too much concern over the nation?); they would not seek

0945: Blank

to make

1000 McLaughlin, hsr, al freedom, Vagt

hsr: communicate with Sows, don't take for granted

a) we know their thinking b) they know ours.

McN: thought at State (Lundy?) is, best way to keep Sows
out is to be quiet, say nothing to them.

J: ~~McN~~: McN: ^{he} fears that to communicate directly might
force them to take a position [publicly? privately?]
denouncing our move.
[So what?

Tell Sows:

J: a) facts

b) limited nature; not Johnson buying Goldwater line

(John: there is something of that) — we is but not worldwide.

10/10

phon

Thompson to McN: a) he concurs wholeheartedly US should not approach Sov directly (me: UN, Amb.; this would force them to take position we don't want.

b) UN debate will bring out facts.

c) SC in better position ^{in debate} with Chicom if com say have not talked to US.

d) CBS reports Sov accounts of in news refer to US

"counterattacks"; this very signif (if not merely quote from US accounts; if this is SC line).

(from Sy Weiss: for Rusk - Butler phon talks of last couple days, Butler reported on talks with K, who repeatedly said events in SE Asia didn't concern him. Interpreted as signal from K.

McK: this confirms his belief, better not to confront SC directly).

1025: McMan - Cleveland. UN line; explanation of deployment.

[Do we want to imply further actions : a) based on this incident ?

b) if they don't stop. . . ?

i.e. do we suggest we have started Rostow approval?

[What do we ask of NV? merely to stop this own program, attacks on US? Or — "it is now time to stop. . . ."] [Is WH inclined to use this to reconsider policy?]